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The N-Player Trust Game and its Replicator
Dynamics
Hussein Abbass, Garrison Greenwood, and Eleni Petraki
Abstract—Trust is a fundamental concept that underpins the
coherence and resilience of social systems and shapes human
behavior. Despite the importance of trust as a social and psy-
chological concept, the concept has not gained much attention
from evolutionary game theorists. In this paper, an N-player
trust-based social dilemma game is introduced. While the theory
shows that a society with no untrustworthy individuals would
yield maximum wealth to both the society as a whole and
the individuals in the long run, evolutionary dynamics show
this ideal situation is reached only in a special case when the
initial population contains no untrustworthy individuals. When
the initial population consists of even the slightest number of
untrustworthy individuals, the society converges to zero trusters,
with many untrustworthy individuals. The promotion of trust is
an uneasy task, despite the fact that a combination of trusters
and trustworthy trustees is the most rational and optimal social
state. This paper presents the game and results of replicator
dynamics in a hope that researchers in evolutionary games see
opportunities in filling this critical gap in the literature.
Index Terms—Trust, Evolutionary Game Theory, Trust Game,
N-Person Trust Game
I. INTRODUCTION
TRUST is the glue of a social system [24]. Despite itsvital role in the society, the concept is absent from the
evolutionary computation literature. When compared to the
large number of papers published on the iterated prisoner
dilemma [13], [6], [21], [2], [27], [23], there has not been
any publication on trust. The contributions of this paper are
three-fold. First, it aims to encourage more work on trust in
the evolutionary computation and evolutionary game theory
research areas. Second, it introduces a novel N-player trust
game that assists researchers in understanding and analyzing
the concept of trust using evolutionary game theory. The game
is a social dilemma and generalizes the concept of trust, which
is normally modelled as a sequential game, to a population of
players that can play the game concurrently. Third, it presents
the first theoretical analysis of the dynamics of the game using
replicator dynamics.
A recent review on trust in social and psychological litera-
ture [30] demonstrated that there are abundant studies on the
roles of trust [10], [11], [24] and its implications for social
and human systems [12], [14], [17], [31], including ethical
considerations [3] surrounding studies of trust and the means
for influencing and shaping trust [5], [26]. Managers perceive
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how an understanding of how trust is formed can create
opportunities to develop loyal customers [4] and improve
relationships among employees and management [19], [33],
[32]. Individuals perceive trust as a vulnerability [26] in which
one person exposes himself to another by relying on the
other person to make a decision on his/her behalf, as an
opportunity [28] to create favorable outcomes, and as a source
of unwanted uncertainty [16] that creates a relationship in
which the trustee has power over the trusting party.
In the social and psychological literature, trust is described
as playing two important roles. First, sociologically, it acts as
a complexity-reduction mechanism [24], allowing individuals
with limited cognitive capacities to manage the complex world
they live in. Luhmann [24] showed that trust creates a positive
feedback loop in a social system. As individuals use trust
to manage complexity, relationships emerge, a process that
increases complexity and thus creates more reinforcement and
opportunities for trust to spread.
Second, psychologically, it acts as an ambiguity- and
uncertainty-reduction mechanism for individuals [9], [11].
Deutsch [11] argues that a trusting situation occurs when a
truster perceives that a situation has one of two potential
outcomes, where one is perceived to have a negative valency
of greater absolute value than the positive valency attributed
to the second. However, which outcome will occur depends on
the trustee. If the truster chooses to proceed, the truster is said
to trust the trustee; otherwise, the truster distrusts the trustee.
Context influences the perceived levels of both trustworthiness
and risk; as the risk of trusting changes from one context to
another, the decision to trust changes as well. Therefore, trust
and risk are tightly coupled concepts.
Trust games are sequential in nature. The truster must first
decide whether to trust the trustee. If the decision is to trust the
trustee, the trustee must then decide whether to be trustworthy
or not. Each decision can be a binary decision or be considered
as part of a continuum representing the degree of either trust or
trustworthiness. Although the proposed game relies on binary
decision-making, it can easily be generalized to include non-
binary decisions. Neuroeconomic experiments use two main
forms of trust games [1], [9], [16]. We will call them TG1
and TG2 for trust game 1 and 2, respectively.
TG1 [22] is a non-zero-sum game, and the truster must
choose whether to trust the trustee. If the truster chooses not to
trust the trustee, both players receive $5. If the truster chooses
to trust the trustee, then the trustee must decide whether to
be trustworthy or not. If the trustee chooses to be trustworthy,
the truster and trustee receive $10 and $15, respectively. If the
trustee chooses to defect, the truster gets nothing, whereas the
trustee gets $25.
2Fig. 1. Game tree for a 2-player TG1.
Fig. 2. Game tree for a general 2-player TG1G.
In this game, a rational truster would be indifferent to the
two choices under the assumption that the trustee’s probability
of being trustworthy is 0.5. Therefore, the expected return for
the truster, regardless of the decision to trust or not, is $5. The
trustee, however, benefits more if the truster chooses to trust
the trustee. In this case, in a one-off situation, a rational trustee
would choose to defect to maximize his or her own return.
However, over repeated iterations, the trustee has an incentive
to be trustworthy because being so will yield maximum returns
to both the trustee and truster. The game tree for this game
can be seen in Figure 1.
TG1 can be generalized, we call it TG1G, to the game tree
shown in Figure 2. An early version of this general form was
presented in [7] and the general version was then analyzed
in [25].
TG2 [1] is also a non-zero-sum game. Both the truster and
trustee start with an endowment of $12. The truster makes the
first move by deciding how much money to transfer to the
trustee. The money is tripled on the way to the trustee. The
trustee then must decide how much money to transfer back to
the truster. If X is the amount of money the truster sent to the
trustee and Y is the amount of money the trustee sends back
to the truster, then the truster will end up with a balance of 12
- X + Y while the trustee ends up with a balance of 12 + 3X
- Y. Both the truster and trustee end up with the same balance
TABLE I
UTILITY MATRIX FOR A 2-PLAYER TRUST GAME.
Truster Trustee
Starting Balance 12 12
Pay X Y
Receive Y 3X
Net Wealth 12−X + Y 12 + 3X − Y
when Y = 2X. In this game, X is a measure of trust and Y is
a measure of trustworthiness. This game is represented in the
following table.
Neither TG1 nor TG2 create a complete social dilemma. If
the truster chooses to trust the trustee, then the total wealth,
independent of whether the trustee is trustworthy or not, is $25
in TG1 and 24 + 2X in TG2. The social dilemma, therefore,
is reliant only on the truster’s decision. However, in TG1G,
the game is a social dilemma when 0 < r < 1.
II. N-PLAYER TRUST GAME
Assume N players. Each player must make two decisions
in advance. The first is to decide whether to be trustworthy or
not. The second is to decide whether to govern (be a governor
or a trustee) or be governed (be a citizen or a truster). We
will denote the former as G and the latter as C. Assume the
number of players that decided to be type C is x1 and the
number of players that decided to be type G is x2 + x3; such
that, N = x1 + x2 + x3.
In real-world settings, the role of the truster and trustee
are defined a priori. For example, an investor chooses to
invest, while a financial planning advisor chooses to become
one before the two actors decide to enter into a trusting
relationship. This type of decision we refer to as a social
choice. The second type of decision normally decided a
priori as well is whether the trustee will be trustworthy or
not. The reason it is ‘normally’ decided a priori is that it
largely depends on the behavioral attitude and value system
of the trustee. We acknowledge that context influences this
behavioral attribute but we conjecture that this decision is
fundamentally a core behavioral attribute of the agent. We
call this decision a behavioral choice.
In summary, it is reasonable to assume that the two types
of decisions related to social and behavioral choices can be
done a priori.
A player of type C pays tv to the government, where tv
denotes the trusted value. The dynamics of the game is in
general independent of the value of tv, which can be set to 1.
However, we maintain tv to allow flexibility in adopting the
game to different contexts. With x1 players of type C, the total
money that is sent to the government is x1 · tv. Each player
of type G receives (x1 · tv)/(x2 + x3). Assume x2 players
of type G decide to be trustworthy, while x3 decide to not
be trustworthy. A player in the x2 population returns to the
citizens a multiplier of R1 of what was received and keeps the
same amount for himself, with R1 > 1. A player in the x3
population returns nothing to the citizens and keeps for himself
a multiplier of R2 of what was received, where R1 < R2 <
3Fig. 3. Game tree for the proposed N-player trust game.
2R1. The payoff matrix for this game can then be represented
as shown in Table II with the following constraints:
1 < R1 < R2 < 2R1 (1)
N = x1 + x2 + x3 (2)
The game tree is presented in Figure 3 for an arbitrary
number of players.
Theorem 1: x3 = N is a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. The order of the net individual wealth in the table
from left to right is a monotonically increasing sequence. A
player deciding to play according to any strategy on the right-
hand side will yield a better net individual wealth than any of
the strategies on the left-hand side. The best net individual
wealth occurs for players in x3. Any rational player will
choose to be a governor and untrustworthy. Thus, the Nash
equilibrium occurs when all players choose to be governors
and untrustworthy. 
The total combined wealth CW of the population is
CW =
{
x1 · tv
(
2·R1·x2
x2+x3
+ R2·x3
x2+x3
− 1
)
if x2 + x3 ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(3)
Theorem 2: The maximum of CW occurs when x2 = 1
and x3 = 0.
Proof. Given the constraints on R1 and R2, CW has a lower
bound of zero regardless of the value of x2 + x3. Therefore,
to maximize CW , we only need to focus on the case when
x2 + x3 ≥ 1. Substituting x3 = (x2 + x3)− x2 into Eq. (3),
CW = x1 · tv ·
(
2R1 · x2
x2 + x3
− 1 +R2−
R2x2
x2 + x3
)
= x1 · tv ·
(
(2R1−R2) · x2
x2 + x3
+ (R2− 1)
)
= (N − (x2 + x3)) · tv ·(
(2R1−R2) · x2
x2 + x3
+ (R2− 1)
)
Recall that R2 > (2R1 − R2) > 0, N is a constant, and
x2 + x3 ≥ 1, the maximum of the function will occur when
x2 + x3 is at a minimum (x2 + x3 appears twice, once with a
negative sign in the numerator and once in the denominator)
while x3 = 0 is the maximum for
x2
x2+x3
; therefore, x2+x3 =
1 ⇒ x2 = 1. 
Theorem 3: x1 = N − 1 and x2 = 1 is Pareto Optimal.
Proof. The single x2 player can switch to an x3 player or
an x1 player; either change reduces the x1 player payoff to
zero. All investments are split among the x2 and x3 players
so any x1 player that changes to an x2 or x3 player reduces
the payoff to the single x2 player. The proof follows that any
player unilaterally switching roles reduces the payoff to an x1
player. 
Our investigations indicate other Pareto Optimal solutions
exist, but the one in Theorem 3 is known as a social welfare
maximizer or socially optimal solution because it maximizes
the total utility for the population.
If every player chooses to be a governor and untrustworthy,
the net individual wealth is zero. In contrast, if a player
chooses to be in the x1 population, he or she can lose all of
their money if all of the governors are untrustworthy. Would
a single trustworthy governor emerge in this population to
maximize the combined wealth of the population?
The evolutionary behavior of a population playing the trust
game can be studied using replicator dynamics [20]. Let yk be
the frequency of the xk players in an infinitely large population
with
∑
k
yk = 1. Then the time evolution of yk is given by
the differential equation
y˙k = yk ·
(
fk − f¯
)
where fk is the expected fitness of an individual playing
strategy k at time t and f¯ is the mean population fitness. Here,
fitness and net wealth are equivalent. The number of copies
of a strategy increases if fk > f¯ and decreases if fk < f¯ . We
can calculate f¯ as follows
f¯ =
y1 · y2 · tv (2 · R1− 1) + y1 · y3 · tv · (R2− 1)
(y2 + y3)
The three replicator equations (Note that y2 + y3 = 1 − y1)
are
y˙1 =
y21 · tv
1− y1
(y2 (1− 2 · R1) + y3 · (1−R2))+
y1 · tv
1− y1
(y2 (R1− 1)− y3)
y˙2 =
y1 · y2 · tv
1− y1
· (y2 (1− 2 · R1) + y3 (1−R2) +R1)
y˙3 =
y1 · y3 · tv
1− y1
· (y2 (1− 2 · R1) + y3 (1−R2) +R2)
4TABLE II
UTILITY MATRIX FOR A N-PLAYER TRUST GAME.
Player in the x1 population Player in the x2 population Player in the x3 population
Pay tv R1 · tv · x1
x2+x3
0
Receive R1 · tv · x2
x2+x3
2 ·R1 · tv · x1
x2+x3
R2 · tv · x1
x2+x3
Net Wealth tv · (R1 · x2
x2+x3
− 1) R1 · tv · x1
x2+x3
R2 · tv · x1
x2+x3
Fig. 4. A 2-simplex showing the time evolution for a game with R1 = 6,
R2 = 8, tv = 10, and different initial distributions of y1, y2 and y3.
Figure 4 shows the population evolution for various initial
player distributions. The replicator equations predict there is
a critical ratio of x1 to x2 players that acts as an attractor
where players rapidly switch strategy to become untrust-
worthy. However, untrustworthy players do not completely
take over the population because a certain proportion always
remains trustworthy even when there are a few or no investors
left. Without investors—i.e., y1 = 0—each replicator equation
has the form y˙k = 0, which is a fixed point. Importantly,
when there are no longer any investors, the net worth of all
remaining players is zero. Consequently, there is no incentive
to switch strategies and a steady-state condition exists.
The bottom trajectory in Figure 4 shows an extreme case
that is highly favorable to a small number of trustworthy play-
ers: a population composed almost entirely of investors with
almost no untrustworthy players. Under these circumstances,
the net worth of a trustworthy player is much higher than that
of an investor; therefore evolution should favor the trustworthy
players. Untrustworthy players have an even higher net worth,
but they are initially rare in the population. The replicator
equations initially predict very rapid growth in trustworthy
players with a corresponding plummet in investors. However,
the inevitable increase of untrustworthy players reverses the
trustworthy player growth. Even in this extreme case, the
steady-state condition is reached.
The replicator equations predict interesting behavior in the
trust game. Regions to the left of the attractor have low C to
G ratios. Since investments are split among G players higher
returns go to x1 players if most G players are trustworthy. The
Fig. 5. A 2-simplex showing the time evolution for a game with tv = 10 and
different R1 and R2 values (R1 < R2). Values increase from left to right
with R1 = 1.5, R2 = 2.9 for the far left trajectory to R1 = 6, R2 = 8 for
the far right trajectory. Initial distribution is y1(0) = 0.1, y2(0) = 0.8, and
y3(0) = 0.1.
replicator equations predict x2 players will mostly switch to
x1 players. Conversely to the right of the attractor there is a
high C to G ratio. Under those circumstances there is a strong
temptation to be untrustworthy and the replicator equations
predict a sharper rise in x3 players. Near the attractor the
returns to x1 and x2 players are roughly the same so there
is little incentive to switch from x2 to x1 or vica versa. The
maximum return is obtained by becoming untrustworthy and
the replicator equations predict virtually all strategy changes
are to x3 players. Eventually the trajectories intersect the y2−
y3 line where there are no investors. At that point all replicator
equations are of the form y˙k = 0 and a fixed point is reached.
This makes perfect sense because, without any investors, there
is no incentive to switch strategies.
Figure 5 shows the effect of different R1 and R2 values
(but with R1 < R2). A fixed point is still always reached,
but the lower the values, the more trustworthy players in
the final population. The reason is lower R1 and R2 values
cause the y1 players to go extinct quicker, which limits the
growth of untrustworthy players. Notice the similarity of these
trajectories to those in Figure 4, which suggests the presence
of an attractor. However, although all attractors are oriented
in the same direction, their location in the 2-simplex depends
on the R1 and R2 values.
Theorem 4: y3 = 0, y1 =
R1−1
2R1−1
and y2 =
R1
2R1−1
is a
5y1
y3
y2
Fig. 6. A 2-simplex showing the time evolution for a game with tv = 10,
R1 = 6, R2 = 8 with different ratios of y1 and y2 while maintaining y3 = 0
and y1 + y2 + y3 = 1.
fixed point.
Proof. The above fixed point is a non-trivial solution for the
replicator equations as a homogeneous system.
Figure 6 shows the fixed point discussed in Theorem 4. Any
starting point on the y1 − y2 axis, where y1 + y2 + y3 = 1
and y3 = 0 would converge to a fixed point on this axis. The
fixed point in this example, where R1 = 6 is y1 = 0.454 and
y2 = 0.545. This fixed point is shown with a black square in
Figure 6.
In summary, the replicator equations predict a rapid growth
of untrustworthiness in the population, leading to the eventual
extinction of investors. However, a fraction of the population
always remains trustworthy, even in the absence of investors.
This predicted steady-state outcome is independent of the
initial player distribution, but the ratio of trustworthy to
untrustworthy players in the final population is dependent on
the R1 and R2 values.
The above study and the literature review demonstrate that
the area of modelling trust in evolutionary game theory is in
its infancy. Many opportunities exist to study this fascinating
topic. For example, similar to Yeh and Yang [34], one can
study the dynamics of the game on a social network, or use
genetic algorithms to evolve strategies for the game [8]. Many
of the assumptions that have been relaxed for the iterated
prisoner dilemma still hold in the trust games discussed
above. For example, one can study the impact of memory
size on the game [23] and the impact of memory on the
cognitive resources of the agents [15]. Last, but not least,
opportunities exist on the study of the fitness landscape of
the trust game [18], [29], which can reveal insight into the
level of hardness or difficulties in discovering novel strategies,
especially in the context of mixed strategy.
III. CONCLUSION
Trust is a fundamental concept for social systems and
individuals alike. Previous games of trust are limited to 2
players. Previous work in neuroeconomics introduced basic
forms of two-player games to model trust and described the
relationships between trusting decisions and human neural
functions. These games do not create a social dilemma where
the total social wealth depends on the decisions of both truster
and trustee, and they do not generalize to multiple players.
The field of evolutionary computation has seen little or no
work on trust, despite the socioeconomic and psychological
significances of the concept.
In this work, we introduce a new N-player trust game that
can model trust decisions among many players. It creates a
social dilemma in which individuals who attempt to maximize
their own benefits in the short run maximize neither the
society’s social wealth nor their own benefits in the long
run. The results revealed that, while the optimal solution
for the population exists when N-1 players choose to be
trusters and the remaining players choose to be trustees,
this optimal solution is a needle in a haystack, causing the
evolutionary dynamics to consistently converge to a population
without any trusters and with a combination of trustworthy and
untrustworthy individuals. The exception to this phenomenon
occurs when the initial population is free of untrustworthy
players. The proposed game shows that trust is an uneasy but
worthwhile concept.
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